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Abstract
Why do similarly sized peacekeeping missions vary in their effectiveness to protect civilians in conflicts? We argue
that peace operations with a large share of troops from countries with high-quality militaries are better able to deter
violence from state and non-state actors and create buffer zones within conflict areas, can better reach remote
locations, and have superior capabilities – including diplomatic pressure by troop contributing countries – to
monitor the implementation of peace agreements. These operational advantages enable them to better protect
civilians. Combining data from military expenditures of troop contributing countries together with monthly data
on the composition of peace operations, we create a proxy indicator for the average troop quality of UN PKOs.
Statistical evidence from an extended sample of conflicts in Africa and Asia between 1991 and 2010 supports our
argument.
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Introduction
Do peacekeeping operations (PKOs) with well-trained
troops and advanced military hardware better protect
civilians from violence in armed conflicts than ill-
equipped deployments? Or is it only troop size and
mission diversity that shape a PKO’s ability to reduce
violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman & Shan-
non, 2013; Bove & Ruggeri, 2016)? The cases of the
Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali illustrate these
questions well: despite the presence of over 9,000 troops
in the CAR in September 2015, the Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA) failed to contain the killing of 75
civilians in September of the same year. Amnesty Inter-
national (AI) reports that – in addition to an extremely
difficult political situation in the country – major gaps in
training and equipment of the peacekeepers from, inter
alia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali,
Vietnam, or Yemen, significantly contributed to the mis-
sion’s failure. AI quotes a MINUSCA force staff obser-
ving that ‘[w]hen there’s gunfire, we can only send the
guys in armored vehicles. But several of these are cur-
rently out of service. [ . . . ] This reduces our capacity of
intervention’ (Amnesty International, 2016: 18).
Contrast this with the peacekeeping mission in Mali,
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabi-
lization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that was estab-
lished in April 2013. Despite a mission strength that was
significantly lower at the time than that of MINUSCA
(about 5,000 troops in August 2013) in a country about
twice the size of the CAR, the UN operation successfully
stabilized the situation in Mali and monitored the pres-
idential elections in August 2013. MINUSMA was in a
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much better position to respond to threats against civi-
lians than MINUSCA, in part due to the fact that the
mission consisted, inter alia, of highly trained troops
from the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Finland,
and included sufficient transport vehicles.1 This logistical
advantage – together with the diplomatic support that
accompanied the troops from Western contributors –
enabled MINUSMA to effectively stabilize the country
and monitor the political situation around the 2013
elections.
Previous studies largely agree that UN peacekeeping
has a positive effect on the reduction of violence both in
terms of battle-deaths and civilian killings. Findings dif-
fer, however, in the explanations offered for a reduction
of casualties, pointing towards mission size (Fortna,
2008; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013), type of
mission (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Hultman, 2010) or
mission diversity (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016). We agree
with existing research that troop size and mission diver-
sity can reduce violence against civilians. We argue, how-
ever, that mission-level variation in a United Nations
(UN) mission’s troop quality has an independent and
empirically observable negative effect on one-sided vio-
lence. Focusing on troop quality in this way helps to
explain the question of mismatch between the numbers
of troops deployed and mission effectiveness.
Higher quality peacekeepers are better equipped and
trained to create buffer zones between combatants and to
monitor ceasefires and peace agreements. Together,
deterrence, buffer zones, and better monitoring, includ-
ing better intelligence and diplomatic pressure, raise the
costs of one-sided violence and lower its benefits to both
rebels and governments, ultimately reducing rebels’ and
governments’ targeting of civilians. Using military
expenditure data from troop contributing countries
(TCCs) to UN peace operations, we find empirical
support for this argument in an extended sample of
70 intrastate conflict episodes in Africa and Asia between
1991 and 2010.
A number of factors could make this relationship
between troop quality and the protection of civilians a
spurious one. Former colonial powers, such as France or
the United Kingdom (UK), systematically deploy troops
to UNmissions in their former colonies. Other countries
with more advanced military equipment, such as
Germany or Japan, have traditionally been risk-averse
when it comes to UN peace operations. Other variables
that could bias our results are the general political willing-
ness of contributing countries to deploy troops, as well as
training and organization of forces (Tellis et al., 2000:
143 ff; Brooks & Stanley, 2007). To tackle these prob-
lems, we subject our main analysis to a series of robustness
checks. We re-estimate our models on a matched sample,
with conflict-level and mission-specific fixed effects, as
well as on a sample that includes only conflicts where
peacekeepers were present. In addition, we estimate a wide
range of model specifications that explicitly control for
potential alternative explanations. Our results are robust
to these empirical approaches, suggesting that they are not
driven by selection effects.
Our contribution to the debate on the protection of
civilians by peacekeeping troops is twofold. First, we
complement existing scholarship on peacekeeping oper-
ations by offering a more fine-grained explanation of
their violence-reducing effect and to the question of why
large or diverse peacekeeping troops are not always able
to prevent violence against civilians. Second, we intro-
duce systematic quantitative evidence into a critical pol-
icy debate. Peacekeeping officials, think-tanks, and many
troop contributing countries have long demanded that
countries with more advanced military technology
increase their contributions to UN peace operations
(Smith & Boutellis, 2013; United Nations, 2015). We
show that not only such an increase in numbers, but also
improvements in mission quality have a substantively
significant effect in reducing violence against civilians.
Peacekeeping troop quality and violence
against civilians
Peacekeeping troop quality is defined as the technical
and personal capability of a peace operation as well as
its political support to fulfill its mandate independently
of troop size. The technical and personal capability of a
peacekeeping mission is largely a function of the quality
of the troops from the troop contributing countries,
including training as well as equipment such as weapons
and battle dress, but also larger equipment such as heli-
copters, transport planes, or military vehicles (Daniel,
2008).2 Political support refers to the TCC’s diplomatic
1 Both countries also saw a military intervention by France –
Operation Serval in Mali, Operation Sangaris in the CAR – which
contributed to a stabilization of the countries alongside the
peacekeeping missions.
2 We focus on contingent-owned equipment (COE), i.e. equipment
and soldiers from the TCC. This type of equipment exists alongside
mission-owned equipment. To ensure that our troop quality measure
does not reflect mission expenditures, we also control for PKO
expenditure in our robustness checks.
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bilateral and multilateral engagement in the mission
country alongside the deployment of its troops, which
is dependent on a number of factors such as security
threats towards the TCC, risk-averseness or membership
in the UN Security Council (Tellis et al., 2000, Ch. 7;
Brooks & Stanley, 2007).3 Consequently, holding all
other factors constant, the better the quality of each
troop contributing country’s military deployment to a
UN peacekeeping mission, the better will be the overall
troop quality of the peacekeeping mission. The overall
troop quality of the mission is crucial for the prevention
of one-sided violence against civilians.4
One-sided violence is defined as ‘the use of armed
force by the government of a state or by a formally
organized group against civilians’ (Eck & Hultman,
2007: 235). Violence against civilians is a strategy by
conflict parties to gain a better bargaining position (Eck
& Hultman, 2007) or to enforce collaboration and pun-
ish defection (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).
One of the most important tasks of UN peacekeeping
missions – besides the monitoring of ceasefires and
implementation of peace agreements – is the protection
of civilians and the reduction of one-sided violence
(Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009). We argue that peacekeep-
ing missions with higher overall troop quality are better
able to protect civilians because they are better equipped,
both logistically and politically, to thwart the use of one-
sided violence by conflict parties. Specifically, high-
quality troops are better able to deter violence from state
and non-state actors, to create buffer zones between
combatants, and to monitor ceasefires and peace agree-
ments which raise the costs of one-sided violence and
lower its benefits to both rebels and governments.
First, high-quality peacekeeping missions can better
deter conflict actors that target civilians than lower-
quality missions. If we consider violence against civilians
as a strategic action by conflict actors, better equipped
peacekeeping missions are potentially more dangerous to
conflict parties as they function as costly response to the
targeting of civilians by conflict parties. Thus, the poten-
tial of high-quality peacekeeping missions to deter
attacks increases combatants’ costs of civilian victimiza-
tion to a greater extent than the responses of peacekeep-
ing missions of lower quality. In February 2014 a review
of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation
in Darfur (UNAMID) stated for instance that ‘shortfalls
in the operational capabilities of the Mission’s military
and police components [are a] key challenge to effective
mandate implementation, particularly with respect to
the protection of civilians and ensuring unhindered
humanitarian access. Those shortfalls seriously constrain
the force’s mobility, effectiveness and ability to deter
attacks’ (United Nations, 2014: 8, emphasis added).
Second, high-quality missions are in a better position
to create buffer zones between rebel groups and
between combatants and civilians, because they are bet-
ter able to respond to the logistical challenges posed by
conflict-affected territories. Conflict countries typically
suffer from enormous destruction of infrastructure. The
main challenge peacekeepers face in such an environ-
ment is the logistics of moving troops in remote regions
of the country. In the absence of functioning streets and
railways, better military equipment, such as transport
helicopters or planes, is essential to deploy peacekeepers
even in remote areas (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis,
2016). Without such equipment, even nominally large
peacekeeping operations will have difficulties in creat-
ing effective buffer zones between conflict parties that
prevents them from targeting civilians. The UN Mis-
sion in South Sudan (UNMISS) is a case in point:
despite a mission size of over 12,000 armed peace-
keepers, more than 100 civilians and four UN peace-
keepers were killed in attacks between December 2013
and July 2016 (Patinkin, 2017). The lack of civilian
protection was caused by the force being too stretched
to patrol a country the size of France; hence it was not
able to deploy to a rebel stronghold in the northeast,
where a government offensive had displaced thousands
of civilians (Patinkin, 2017).
Third, high-quality peacekeeping troops are also in a
better position to monitor conflict parties’ behavior. This
is especially important when the tasks of the peacekeep-
ing mission include the oversight of a ceasefire or peace
agreement, when the process of keeping the peace and
political negotiations towards a long-lasting solution go
hand in hand. Better equipment, such as planes, satellite
imagery, and radio equipment, allows more effective
reconnaissance, especially of remote areas, and thus bet-
ter monitoring of combatants. The failure of the United
Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)
in Angola highlights this point. Nicholas Howen, the
mission’s Human Rights Unit director, stated:
3 It does not include the mission’s mandate, which we discuss
separately below.
4 ‘Holding all other factors constant’ implies the assumption that
TCCs are also willing to use higher quality troop commitments in
PKOs. Empirically, there are exceptions to this. We therefore relax
this assumption and in the robustness checks section we address the
question of whether some kind of TCCs (e.g. risk-averse or
strategically motivated TCCs) systematically commit and deploy
troops to certain kinds of operations.
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‘UNAVEM [III]’s intelligence was poor. Communica-
tion flows between the provinces and its [ . . . ] headquar-
ters in Luanda were sporadic; liaison between different
departments [ . . . ] itself was often fragmented due to
factionalism among staff and overly bureaucratic proce-
dures’ (cited in Guyot & Vines, 2015: 336). These
operational difficulties contributed to the inability of the
mission to uphold the ceasefire and both parties resumed
violent campaigns against civilians shortly after.
Another channel through which high-quality
troops increase a mission’s ability to monitor (and
influence) combatant behavior is increased diplomatic
pressure. A peacekeeping mission is often accompa-
nied by a number of mediation and negotiation stra-
tegies that aim to increase the diplomatic pressure on
the conflict parties. Troops in PKOs with higher
quality equipment typically come from countries with
higher military expenditures. Those countries that are
willing and in the logistical position to deploy troops
to a given conflict are often more willing to engage
diplomatically to end the conflict (Camin˜a & Porteiro,
2009). For instance, the Lome´ peace agreement between
the government of Sierra Leone and the rebel group
RUF was signed after international pressure and sanc-
tions by the UN and other actors such as the regional
organization ECOWAS (see UN Security Council reso-
lution 1132). While it did not bring a final end to the
violence, it paved the way for the settlement of the
armed conflict.
Hypothesis: A UN peacekeeping operation with higher
troop quality reduces the level of violence against
civilians.
Figure 1 summarizes our argument and the causal
mechanisms.
Data and research design
To test this hypothesis, we quantitatively investigate the
impact of peacekeeping troop quality on incidences and
magnitude of one-sided violence. The starting point for
our analysis is all intrastate conflicts between 1991 and
2010 captured by version 1.9 of the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP
GED) (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). To be included
in the GED dataset, a conflict must have exceeded
25 battle-related deaths per year.5 The GED project
further provides data on all three of the UCDP’s cate-
gories of organized violence: state-based armed conflict,
non-state conflict, and one-sided violence. The last cate-
gory allows us to combine information on armed conflict
with incidences of one-sided violence by the govern-
ment, rebel groups, or both. Also, ‘the theoretical pro-
cesses associated with victimization may continue after
Figure 1. The expected relationship between peacekeeping troop quality and violence against civilians
5 We exclude Rwanda from our sample since the Rwandan genocide
in 1994 constitutes a substantial outlier in the counts of civilian
deaths as a result of one-sided violence.
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the cessation of hostilities’ (Hultman, Kathman & Shan-
non, 2013: 882). Thus, we add two years of observations
to the end of each conflict episode. These selection cri-
teria result in the inclusion of 70 conflict episodes in our
dataset, 39 in Africa and 32 in Asia (see Online appendix
A). From this base sample we create a dataset with
conflict-months as unit of observation.6
Dependent variable: One-sided violence (OSV)
We measure the protection of civilians as the monthly
count of one-sided violence as reported by the GED
dataset. In our mechanism analysis below, we distinguish
between OSV conducted by rebels and OSV perpetrated
by the government.
Measuring UN peacekeeping troop quality
We consider a TCC’s overall military capabilities as a
rough proxy for the quality of its deployed peacekeeping
troops. Specifically, we use a TCC’s annual military
expenditures in constant 2011 US dollars divided by the
number of armed personnel (short: spending per capita)
to operationalize its military capabilities.7 Similar to
most of the existing literature, we use data from the
Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI) (SIPRI,
2014) on countries’ military expenditures.8
We are aware of the fact that military spending per
capita is an imperfect measure of a country’s military
capabilities. Military spending is an input measure and
captures a country’s willingness to spend money on its
military. Military capabilities, on the other hand, are
output measures. They denote a country’s ability to
translate its spending into military outcomes. Unfortu-
nately, research lacks more detailed data on military cap-
abilities and the translation of a country’s input measures
into actual military outcomes. Thus, expenditures are
widely used in the literature as a proxy for military
capabilities (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This shortcoming
is particularly pronounced when it comes to capturing
training quality. Yet we are optimistic that our measure
also captures training quality, at least to some extent.
First, our primary measure is calculated as expenditures
per number of armed personnel. This normalization by
army size takes into account that oversized militaries, for
instance due to conscription, might also imply higher
overall spending. Second, our measure is calculated in
constant 2011 USD. This accounts for purchasing
power differences across countries, including differences
in salaries (which could reflect training quality), albeit
imperfectly.9 Finally, higher spending on equipment
implies more complex machinery which, in turn, also
requires better training to operate. Simply put, high
expenditures on drones or surveillance equipment also
require additional training. Thus, we are confident that
our measure captures the training aspect of a country’s
military capability as well.
We believe that a country’s military spending posi-
tively correlates with the quality of a country’s troop
contributions to a peacekeeping operation. Many West-
ern countries that have high per-capita military spending
rates compared to other militaries are also often very risk-
averse when it comes to their military deployments
(Scho¨rnig & Lembcke, 2006). Consequently, we can
assume that these countries’ military spending translates
to better equipment as well as diplomatic engagement
with the mission country in order to protect their sol-
diers in the field – and thus also their soldiers in peace-
keeping operations. Even if countries systematically
select the least trained units and the worst maintained
equipment as their contributions to peacekeeping oper-
ations, higher levels of spending should still be associated
with a better equipment of such contributions, on aver-
age. To corroborate this proposition, we exploit a dataset
by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) (see
Online appendix E for details). The dataset contains
information on the number of pieces of specialized
equipment in UN peace operations, such as combat
vehicles or transport helicopters for June 2014 (the only
6 The dataset design follows Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2013),
but on an updated sample built from the UCDP GED version 1.9.
GED 1.9 includes both a longer period of observation (until 2010, as
opposed to 2008) and a greater geographical scope (Africa plus South
East Asia, as opposed to sub-Saharan Africa).
7 We also use total annual military spending (not normalized by
military personnel) as well as spending as a share of GDP as a
robustness check for the troop quality measure, which does not
substantively alter our results. See Online appendix D.2.
8 SIPRI (2015: n.p.) defines military expenditures as ‘all current and
capital expenditure on the armed forces, including peace keeping
forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged
in defence projects; paramilitary forces when judged to be trained,
equipped and available for military operations; and military space
activities.’
9 Imperfection in measuring salary disparities across countries not
only stems from differences in purchasing power parity (for which
we account), but also from different relative costs between personnel
and equipment (for which we cannot account). To put it differently,
the costs of machinery typically remain relatively constant (fighter jets
are expensive everywhere) whereas it is less expensive to train fighter
pilots in some countries than others. There is a lack of data on relative
personnel vs. equipment spending, however, so we cannot directly
measure this.
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month for which data are available). We correlate our
troop quality measure that is based on TCC military
spending (see below) with the CIC’s recorded number
of equipment pieces across different equipment types.
We report a positive relationship between higher values
of our mission-specific troop quality data and more spe-
cialized pieces of equipment per mission. Despite this
positive correlation, a number of factors can systemati-
cally influence which troops a country deploys to a mis-
sion (or if it deploys them at all). These factors include
risk-aversion, strategic interests in the mission country, a
culture of restrictive rules of engagement, and others. We
address these concerns in the robustness check section,
particularly in Table D.1 in the Online appendix.
To translate individual TCC military spending into a
measure of a peacekeeping operation’s troop quality, we
exploit information about the size of its troop contribu-
tions to each mission. The United Nations Department
of Peacekeeping Operations provides detailed data on
these contributions on a monthly basis (Kathman,
2013; Perry & Smith, 2013). We use this information
to construct a time-varying weighted average of military
equipment for each mission-month for all missions in
the dataset, using the following formula:
Troop qualitymt ¼
Xn
i¼1spending per capita itroopsiXn
i¼1troopsm
ð1Þ
where for mission m in month t an average troop quality
is calculated for the sum of spending multiplied by troops
for each country i, divided by the sum of all troops of the
mission under consideration. Countries with less mili-
tary spending will decrease the average measure of Troop
quality of the overall mission. By construction, countries
with a higher number of troops will be given a higher
weight in the quality measure than countries with a low
number of troops. The following example illustrates the
construction of our troop quality measure. Table I shows
the troop deployments to the United Nations Operation
in Coˆte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in April 2004 together with
each country’s military expenditure per soldier in con-
stant 2011 US dollars (in millions). The unweighted
average of military spending for this mission-month is
US$ 20.81 million. We can see, however, that France
has the highest military spending per soldier of all troop
contributing countries for UNOCI in this month. The
weighted mean of this mission-month, which explicitly
takes into account this enormous contribution of troops
by France, is US$ 28.53million – considerably higher
than the simple mission mean of military spending per
soldier.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship of this PKO troop
quality measure with troop size, as well as civilian kill-
ings. The upper panel of Figure 2 displays the count of
civilian killings in Coˆte d’Ivoire. The second panel visua-
lizes the development of UNOCI’s troop quality over
time; the third panel shows the number of troops
deployed to the country. Figure 2 indicates that France’s
early contribution to UNOCI led to a spike in the mis-
sion’s equipment measure right after deployment. But
the measure slowly declines as more troops from coun-
tries with lower military spending per soldier deploy
troops to UNOCI, which pull the measure downwards.
The plot also shows two other features of the data: first, it
indicates that variation in troop quality is distinct from
the actual number of troops on the ground. Indeed, the
spike of UNOCI’s troop quality is in March 2004 when
only very few soldiers were actually deployed. The nom-
inal mission strength increases while the troop quality
declines. Second, one-sided violence seems indeed to be
negatively correlated with an increase in troop quality,
Table I. Troop contributions to UNOCI in April 2004
Contributor Troops
Annual spending
per soldier (in USD millions)
France 182 185.83
Brazil 1 35.65
Russian Federation 2 30.56
Uruguay 1 27.57
Kenya 4 19.10
China 2 16.93
Romania 2 14.48
India 4 13.05
Ghana 260 11.33
Benin 260 10.00
Morocco 49 9.65
Paraguay 1 8.42
Senegal 237 8.06
Burkina Faso 1 7.88
Jordan 4 7.73
Nigeria 3 7.24
Pakistan 6 6.66
Togo 231 5.22
Niger 312 4.60
Bangladesh 9 3.78
Gambia 1 3.38
Sum: 1,572
Weighted average: 28.53
Calculations based on IPI data on troop contributions (Perry &
Smith, 2013) and SIPRI data on military expenditures (SIPRI,
2014).
Haass & Ansorg 747
but also with an increase in troop strength. Visually,
however, the effect is difficult to precisely disentangle
from the effect of troop size. To separate out the effect
of troop quality as opposed to troop strength we there-
fore turn to multivariate methods.
Model and control variables
Our empirical approach follows Hultman, Kathman &
Shannon’s (2013) and Bove & Ruggeri’s (2016) econo-
metric strategy in estimating a model of the following
form:
OSVit ¼ ð:Þ ¼ Troop Qualityit1 þ Xit þ OSVit1 þ it
ð2Þ
where the subscripts i and t refer to conflict ID and
month, respectively. OSVit denotes the total number
of civilians killed in conflict-month it. Troop Qualityit–
1 is a measure of our troop quality proxy lagged by one
month and OSVit1 is a lagged dependent dummy vari-
able which takes 1 if in the previous month one-sided
violence occurred and 0 if not in order to control for time
dependency. Xit is a matrix of peacekeeping mission-
specific and conflict-specific control variables (see
below). Eit is the month-specific error term. ð:Þ refers
to a negative binomial link function, since our depen-
dent variable is a count variable. The negative binomial
link function is a reasonable choice as it controls for
heterogeneity and contagion in the data and allows our
data to be highly overdispersed with variance not equal
to the mean (Fox, 2008: 391ff).
We follow Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2013)
and Bove & Ruggeri (2016) by including the following
Start of French deployment
Fa
ta
lit
ie
s 
fr
om
on
e−
si
de
d 
vi
ol
en
ce
Tr
oo
p 
qu
al
ity
sc
or
e
N
um
be
r 
of
 tr
oo
ps
2002 2004 2006
0
50
100
150
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
Year
Figure 2. Troop quality, one-sided violence, and troop strength of UNOCI
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PKO-specific and conflict-specific control variables in
our basic specification: the lagged monthly number of
troops, police, and military observers deployed to the
conflict-month.10 Although Kathman (2013) provides
comprehensive data on troop contributions to UN
peacekeeping missions, we construct this measure using
data from the International Peace Institute (IPI) (Perry
& Smith, 2013) which hand-coded the same data as
Kathman (2013). IPI’s independent coding of the same
data source of UN troop contributions (i.e. monthly
reports by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions) serves as an additional robustness check to Hult-
man et al.’s original approach, which employs Kathman’s
data.
We include the same conflict-specific control vari-
ables as Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2013). A mea-
sure of All battle-related deaths as captured by the UCDP
GED dataset (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Incompat-
ibility is a dummy variable, indicating whether a conflict
was fought over territory or government and is taken
from UCDP (Themne´r & Wallensteen, 2012). Finally
we include Conflict duration (measured in months since
conflict onset) and Population (logged), which is a coun-
try’s population size in a given year (World Bank, 2015).
The Battle deaths and the Duration covariates explicitly
allow us to control for potential adverse selection effects
if troop contributing countries systematically shy away
from particularly violent or long conflicts.
Results and analysis
We report the main results of our quantitative analysis of
the effect of a PKO’s troop quality on one-sided violence
against civilians in Table II. Model 1 represents a base-
line model, assessing the effect of troop quality on
one-sided violence while controlling for a host of
mission-specific and conflict-specific covariates. The
negative and statistically significant coefficient for
the troop quality variable in Model 1 indicates that as
the average spending per soldier of troop contributing
countries increases, the level of civilian killings declines.
Note that the negative relationship between troop qual-
ity and one-sided violence persists even though we expli-
citly control for the number of troops on the ground.
This supports our argument that troop quality has an
effect that is independent of troop size.
The coefficient for numbers of UN troops is negative
and statistically significant across all models, which con-
firms the findings of previous research with our geogra-
phically extended dataset: an increased number of troops
reduces violence against civilians. We do not find, how-
ever, the same negative and statistically significant effect
of UN police on the reduction of one-sided violence as
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon did. Our findings for
UN observers are similarly inconclusive across models.
Our data suggest that only military troops, as well as
troop quality, can lead to a reduction of violence against
civilians.
Troop quality is not only a statistically significant
predictor of reduced one-sided violence, but has also a
substantively meaningful effect. Figure 3 plots the sub-
stantive effects of troop quality and troop size on one-
sided violence against civilians. In the left panel of Figure
3, we simulate the effect of an increase by steps of USD
20 million per soldier on one-sided violence.11 If we
move from zero to an average TCC spending per capita
of USD 115 million the number of civilians killed is
reduced from 21 to about 4. This corresponds to an over
90% reduction in civilian deaths as our troop quality
measure increases from zero to 115. The right panel of
Figure 3 simulates an increase in the number of peace-
keeping troops. This allows us to compare the effect of
troop quality and troop size on one-sided violence. We
see that troop size has a slightly larger effect on the
reduction of civilian victimization than troop quality.
We can use our information about military expendi-
tures of troop contributing countries to simulate the
effects of a troop quality change in a given conflict-
month. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical mission
similar to the MONUC mission in the DR Congo in
June 2002. Our troop quality measure for MONUC in
the DR Congo in June 2002 is around USD 22.2 mil-
lion per capita. In the simulated results of Figure 3, a
troop quality measure of USD 22.2 million corresponds
to about 15 killed civilians per month. In June 2002
both the United Kingdom and France contributed five
soldiers to MONUC. The bulk of the deployment was
shouldered by troops from Uruguay, Mozambique,
Senegal, and Ghana with relatively low military spending
10 By construction, troop size and our measure of troop quality are
correlated, since they can only occur together. This raises concerns
about multicollinearity. However, correlation between the two
measures is weak (0.38) and variance inflation diagnostics for the
models in Table II do not reveal any collinearity problems.
11 We held all quantitative variables at their mean and set
government conflict and lagged OSV dummy variables to 1. Both
simulations in Figure 3 are based on Model 1 in Table II and were
conducted in Stata 13 using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg,
2000).
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Table II. Effect of peacekeeping troop quality on violence against civilians
Base model (1) Matching (2) Fixed effects (3)
FE þ Cubic time
trend (4)
FE þ
PKO only (5)
Troop quality(t–1) –0.02*** –0.01*** –0.01
y –0.01* –0.01**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UN troops(t–1) –0.26*** –0.22*** –0.06** –0.06** –0.09***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
UN police(t–1) 0.32*** 0.41* 0.28** 0.44*** 0.24*
(0.08) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
UN observers(t–1) 0.01*** 0.004* –0.0003 –0.0004 0.001
(0.00) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Government conflict 0.38
(0.56)
Population –0.61* –0.01 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.38***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12)
All battle-deaths(t–1) 3.03*** 0.0018* 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.15
(0.74) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15)
All OSV dummy(t–1) 2.56*** 1.77** 1.82*** 1.78*** 0.85***
(0.28) (0.55) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14)
Conflict duration –0.04 –0.01*** –0.01* –0.07* –0.03*
(0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.03) (0.01)
Conflict duration∧2 0.02***
(0.005)
Conflict duration∧3 –0.0008***
(0.0002)
Constant 11.02* 3.33 –6.65*** –6.75*** –8.04***
(4.83) (3.47) (0.42) (0.43) (1.86)
Alpha 2.40*** 2.10*** – – –
(0.18) (0.33)
No. of observations 7,934 1,382 5,413 5,413 637
No. of conflict episodes 70 17 47 47 21
Wald 2 499 176 1,506 1546 119
Log-Likelihood –13,354 –3,481 –11,286 –11,261 –1,221
yp < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered on conflict. Government conflict drops out of Models 2 to
5 due to collinearity.
Figure 3. Substantive effects of troop quality and troop size on civilian killings
Left panel simulates an increase in troop quality measured as the weighted average expenditure measure per soldier in steps of USD 20 million.
Right panel simulates an increase of troop size in steps of 5,000 soldiers. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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per soldier, thus contributing to the rather low troop
quality measure of MONUC in that particular month.
If we hypothetically add 1,000 troops by France and the
UK, respectively, to that month and keep the deploy-
ments of all other troop contributing countries as they
were, our troop quality measure almost quadruples to
over USD 88.26 million. This corresponds to about five
civilians killed, that is, a drop of ten civilian victims in
comparison to the actual situation in the DRC in June
2002. This suggests that a substantial commitment by
troop contributing countries with a better equipped mil-
itary can substantively reduce the killing of civilians.
The main problem for the robustness of our results
from Model 1 stems from the non-random selection of
the UN missions to which countries with better
equipped military deploy their troops. We therefore fol-
low Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2013) and Gilligan
& Sergenti (2008) and re-analyze Model 1 on a matched
sample, as well as with models that include both conflict-
level fixed effects and mission-specific fixed effects.
Matching allows us to create a dataset which includes
only similar observations, but which differ with respect
to whether a peace operation was deployed or not. Data-
sets pre-processed in such a way resemble fully blocked
experiments which compare a treatment (¼ deployment
to peace operations) group and a control (¼ no deploy-
ment to peace operations) group which are sufficiently
similar but differ in their treatment status (Ho et al.,
2006).12
We include the covariates fromModel 1 in Table II in
our matching approach to explicitly model the selection
of deployment to peace operations dependent on these
covariates.13 Since we include measures of conflict inten-
sity such as battle-deaths and a lagged dummy of
whether one-sided violence occurred or not, we can sys-
tematically control for selection on conflict intensity
variables. Diagnostic statistics reveal that the matching
procedure increases balance between control and treat-
ment groups (see Appendix E, online).
Model 2 in Table II reports the results from an opti-
mal matching without replacement, using the Mahala-
nobis distance between observations. The negative and
statistically significant coefficient for troop quality in
Model 2 provides further evidence for our hypothesis:
if we compare conflict-months that are similar except for
the fact that a peace operation was deployed or not, those
months with higher quality missions deployed in the
previous month see significant reduction in violence
against civilians.14 The results from the matching analy-
sis increase our confidence in the causal interpretation of
the violence-reducing effect of higher-quality peace
operations.
A second source of potential bias comes from time-
invariant variables, both on the level of the conflict and
on the level of individual mission, which might drive the
systematic deployment of troops to some peacekeeping
operations and some conflicts but not to others, such as
in the case of France and its former colonies. To account
for such (and all other sources of) time-invariant hetero-
geneity, we re-analyze Model 1 using conflict-level fixed
effects. The results are reported in Model 3 of Table II.
Additionally in Model 4, we add a cubic time trend to
the fixed effect specification of Model 4. The coefficient
for troop quality becomes smaller, but remains negative
and statistically significant at conventional levels. In
Model 5 of Table II we restrict our sample to observa-
tions in which a peacekeeping operation was deployed.
This allows us to compare only conflict-months in which
a peacekeeping operation was deployed, controlling for
any factors that might drive the systematic selection of
peace operations. Further, we include mission-level fixed
effects in Model 5 of Table II, since time-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity across missions might systematically
affect the deployment of troops to a mission. Even after
accounting for mission-level fixed effects in the PKO-
only sample, the effect of troop quality remains negative
and statistically significant. We are therefore confident
that our results are not biased due to adverse selection on
observable or time-invariant unobservable factors.
12 This treatment choice reflects a trade-off. Matching is designed for
binary treatments. However, the continuous nature of the troop
quality variable makes it difficult to dichotomize it as a binary
treatment without substantial loss of information. Thus, PKO
presence – while controlling for troop size within operations to
tease out the independent effect of troop quality – most reasonably
reflects such a binary treatment while only imperfectly capturing
troop quality treatment. In an alternative approach, we
dichotomize troop quality with varying cutoffs at lower, middle,
and upper quartiles of the troop quality variable. Using the
resulting dummy as treatment variable, our results do not
substantively change, except when we use a 75% cutoff. This could
indicate that increasing troop quality is most effective at lower levels,
consistent with Figure 3. See Appendix E for details.
13 The Government conflict dummy drops out due to collinearity.
14 We include the mission-specific covariates such as number of
troops, police, and observers as well as the other covariates in
Model 2 to account for any residual variance that remains after the
matching procedure (Ho et al., 2006). We nevertheless re-estimate
Model 2 without covariates. The results do not substantively change
(see Appendix E).
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None of our control variables has a consistent and
robust effect on the intensity of violence against civilians
across all model specifications. The coefficient for pop-
ulation is negative in Model 1, but positive and statisti-
cally significant in the fixed effects specifications,
indicating that a counter-intuitive negative effect of pop-
ulation size in Model 1 is largely driven by between-
country variation in population. The positive coefficient
for population in the fixed effects models is in line with
expectations: in highly populated countries, chances for
civilian targeting increase. The lagged dependent variable
is positive and significant, indicating serial correlation of
civilian targeting over time, which is in line with the
findings of Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2013).
Probing causal mechanisms
Having established a general relationship between better
troop quality and reduced targeting of civilians, we turn
to an analysis of the underlying causal mechanisms pro-
posed in our theory. Exploring causal pathways not only
strengthens the credibility of our overall theory by testing
additional observable implications, but allows us to
interpret our results in a more fine-grained manner and
to better inform the policy debate.15
Deterrence
The first causal mechanism we propose is that better
equipped peacekeepers are better able to deter
combatants. A peacekeeping mission with better offen-
sive and defensive capabilities and more professionally
trained personnel poses a greater threat to perpetrators
of violence against civilians than missions without these
features. Deterrence can manifest itself through swift
defensive or offensive actions in reaction to attacks against
civilians, signaling peacekeepers’ future resolve in similar
situations. The intervention brigade of the UN Peace-
keeping mission in the DR Congo, for instance, was
mandated as a direct reply to the ongoing violence against
civilians and to break the persistent cycles of violence. But
deterrence does not necessarily require prior civilian tar-
geting. Peacekeepers can also deter civilian attacks by
showing strength and presence – something that missions
with newer equipment and more training should be better
at than missions with less professional troops and frail
machinery. In these ways, deterrence should prevent rebel
and government forces from civilian targeting not only in
the short term, but also in the future.
Empirically, deterrence thus implies a negative effect
of troop quality on civilian targeting that persists over
time. Our empirical strategy so far, however, has aimed
to establish the relationship between higher score on our
quality variable and levels of civilian targeting in the next
month. From the resulting model setup (see Equation 2),
we therefore cannot know whether the effect persists
over time – it could be that the coefficients in Table II
only represent a short-term dent in the level of one-sided
violence in the next month while jumping back to con-
ventional levels after that. To test for temporal persis-
tence, we thus estimate Model 1 from Table II using
varying leads of our dependent variable. The results are
plotted in Figure 4. The ‘Reference month’ coefficient
Figure 4. Probing mechanisms I: Deterrence and long-term effects of troop quality
Coefficient estimates with 90% (solid line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. ‘Reference month’ is the OSV count in the month used in
Model 1, Table II. ‘1 month’, ‘2 months’ etc. refer to 1, 2, etc. month leads of the OSV variable.
15 We report here only marginal effects and coefficient plots and refer
to our Online supplementary appendix (Section C) for detailed
model results.
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represents the troop quality coefficient from Table II,
whereas the other coefficients represent the relationship
between troop quality and one-sided violence in future
months. Consistent with our expectations, Figure 4 shows
that the effect of troop quality persists over time. The
association even becomes stronger for future levels of vio-
lence against civilians in the medium term up until one
year after the reference month. We take this as evidence
that troop quality indeed shapes one-sided violence
through peacekeeping missions’ ability to deter attacks.
Logistics
The second causal mechanism we put forward concerns
the role of logistical advantage of high-quality peacekeep-
ing troops. The UN often stresses the challenges posed
by environment and weather conditions, such as rain
seasons (Government Accountability Office, 2008: 52).
This implies that the effect of high-quality troops
should be particularly visible in environmentally harsh
environments. We use a country’s monthly rainfall levels
to approximate severe weather conditions.16 We add an
interaction term between monthly rainfall levels and our
troop quality measure to Model 1 from Table II. We
expect a negative sign of the interaction term which
indicates a negative effect of troop quality on civilian
targeting in particularly rainy seasons.17 Figure 5 plots
the conditional marginal effect of troop quality at varying
levels of rainfall. The relationship is negative as expected
and is particularly strong in months characterized by
heavy rainfall. We interpret this result as evidence that
better equipped peacekeepers do indeed have a logistical
advantage in environmentally harsh conditions when it
comes to preventing attacks against civilians.
Monitoring
The third proposed mechanism states that high-quality
peacekeepers are better able to monitor conflict parties’
behavior, thus improving the mission’s capability to
respond to civilian emergencies. We identified two
channels through which monitoring might work: first,
high-quality peacekeepers have better means for commu-
nication through better access to more advanced commu-
nication equipment. Second, high quality peacekeepers
enjoy diplomatic pressure by countries willing to deploy
high-quality peacekeeping troops to a conflict.
An additional empirical implication regarding the first
monitoring channel – communication – concerns the
relationship between mission diversity and access to
communication technology. Bove & Ruggeri (2016)
have shown that mission diversity can play a beneficial
Figure 5. Probing mechanisms II: Logistical advantage and rainfall
Plot shows the conditional marginal effect of a one-unit increase in our troop quality measure (¼1 million USD) at varying monthly rainfall
levels. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence band. The rug plot on the bottom of the x-axis shows the distribution of the rainfall
variable.
16 Another potential variable that approximates difficult
environmental conditions is Mountainous terrain (Fearon & Laitin,
2003). This variable is time-invariant, however, and strips our
monthly observations from much of the within-group variation,
making the direct effect less interpretable. Nevertheless, in the
Online appendix, we use Mountainous terrain as a variable to
control for a potential omitted variable bias resulting from better
equipped troops being systematically sent to logistically more
difficult (¼ more mountainous) countries.
17 Data on rainfall patterns are taken from Harris et al. (2014). We
take the natural log and lag the rainfall variable by one month.
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role for reducing attacks against civilians. More diverse
missions – measured through a troop fractionalization
index that captures the range and diversity of countries
that contribute troops to a peacekeeping force – better
complement each other’s capability and increase their
ability to observe misconduct. At the same time, more
diverse troops can also induce coordination problems
due to the large number of different actors involved.
We argue that better equipment strengthens the positive
impact of diversity and reduces the costs of coordination
problems induced by mission diversity. To test this argu-
ment, we introduce an interaction term between mission
diversity taken from Bove & Ruggeri (2016) and our
troop quality measure of Model 1 from Table II, expect-
ing a negative relationship that indicates a conditionally
negative effect of troop quality and higher levels of mis-
sion diversity.18
Figure 6 does not show the expected effect, however.
There is a statistically significant marginal effect of troop
quality at low levels of fractionalization (between 0.25
and 0.5 on the fractionalization index score). Neverthe-
less, the effect is substantively very small and statistically
insignificant over most of the range of the fractionaliza-
tion variable. We therefore cannot rule out a null effect,
questioning our confidence in a strong interpretation of
this channel of the monitoring mechanism.
Another implication that follows from the second
channel is diplomatic pressure: if troop contributing
countries accompany their troop deployment with dip-
lomatic actions targeted at reducing civilian killings, this
effect should be visible in different effects on the perpe-
trators of one-sided violence. Specifically, we expect that
high-quality troops should be more clearly associated
with a decrease in OSV by the government side than
by the rebel side. Governments are much more amenable
to diplomatic pressure: they rely on foreign aid and the
diplomatic support by TCCs in international organiza-
tions, and are thus more vulnerable to political and eco-
nomic pressure by donor states.19 Furthermore,
governments often prevent the international community
from directly engaging in diplomatic talks with rebel
groups out of fear that this might legitimate insurgents.
Also, governments are typically the direct counterpart
when negotiating peacekeepers’ rules of engagement,
which often also reflects the top-down, nation-level
approaches of most UN peace operations (Autesserre,
2010).
Splitting the OSV variable into rebel and government
OSV, we find support for this expectation as reported by
Figure 7. While there is a substantively stronger relation-
ship between troop quality and OSV perpetrated by the
government side, the effect becomes small and statisti-
cally insignificant for rebel violence only. This indicates
Figure 6. Probing mechanisms III: Information and mission diversity
Plot depicts the conditional marginal effect of a one-unit increase in our troop quality measure (¼1 million USD) at varying levels of Bove &
Ruggeri’s (2016) troop fractionalization measure. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence band. The rug plot shows the distribution of
the troop fractionalization measure.
18 The model without interaction between troop fractionalization
and troop quality also serves as an additional robustness check on
whether our results are driven by the omitted variable of troop
fractionalization, which they are not.
19 In section G of the Online appendix, we provide evidence that
troop quality is indeed positively associated with more foreign aid.
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support for the diplomatic pressure channel of our third
causal mechanism.20
Alternative explanations
We have provided statistical evidence for the argument
that better equipped and better trained peacekeepers
from countries with higher military expenditures system-
atically reduce the level of one-sided violence against
civilians and we have illustrated the causal channels
through which this effect might run. There is a chance,
however, that this pattern results from other factors that
systematically drive both variation in peacekeeping troop
quality and violence against civilians. We therefore con-
ducted a series of robustness checks that we summarize
here for brevity and present in more detail in the Online
appendix.
One challenge to our proposed mechanisms is that
they implicitly assume that TCCs with high quality mili-
taries are willing to both contribute and deploy their
troops within PKOs. To account for the presence or lack
of such political will we conduct a series of robustness
checks. First, we include a control for the mean cumu-
lative number of casualties to which a mission’s troop
contributing countries were exposed since 1990. This
measure should capture (at least to an extent) the risk-
aversion of TCCs (in addition to the control variables for
battlefield violence):21 a TCC that has suffered from
many fatalities in prior peace operations might be more
restrictive in its rules of engagement due to prior ‘bad
experiences’, such as the United States after its partici-
pation in the disastrous UNOSOM II mission in Soma-
lia in the early 1990s. Data for this measure are taken
from the Peacemakers at Risk dataset (Bromley, 2018).
Second, we include a cumulative count of mission-
specific casualties. Deployment rules might be changed,
due not only to the TCC-specific experience of casual-
ties, but also the fact that peacekeepers have died on the
very mission to which countries have deployed their
troops. Data for this variable also come from the PAR
dataset. Third, we include a count of the number of
TCCs that represent one of the P5 countries in the
UN Security Council (UNSC). If our measure reflects
only the impact of the PKO participation by powerful
countries, the independent effect of troop quality should
disappear after including this variable. In an alternative
specification, we use the count of both P5 and non-
Figure 7. Probing mechanisms IV: Diplomatic pressure and government vs. rebel OSV
Coefficient estimates with 90% (solid line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. ‘Gov’t OSV’ refers to one-sided violence perpetrated by
the government only; ‘Rebel OSV’ refers to one-sided violence perpetrated by the rebel side only.
20 Figure 6 might seem to undermine our argument above: logistical
advantages and deterrence should also apply to OSV perpetrated by
rebels – yet the small, insignificant coefficient for rebel OSV suggests
that it does not. This interpretation is misleading, however. As we
document in more detail in Figure C.1 in the Online appendix, the
seeming null finding for rebel OSV in Figure 6 masks different
temporal dynamics of the effect of troop quality across OSV types.
Figure C.1 shows that the effect of troop quality on government OSV
is visible immediately in the following months. The effect of troop
quality on rebel OSV, however, manifests only after about two
months. Thus, a mission’s higher troop quality is more effective in
limiting civilian victimization immediately, suggesting that
diplomatic pressure is a causal channel. Yet the statistically
significant – albeit smaller – coefficients for rebel OSV after two
months (as well as our findings for the interaction with rainfall
above) also provide evidence in favor of the logistical and
deterrence channels.
21 We are aware that this is only an imperfect indicator, as even risk-
averse troops can be attacked.
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permanent UNSC members. Fourth, regional proximity
might affect a TCC’s propensity to deploy troops within
a mission. Conflicts in countries that are closer to a TCC
imply higher security concerns than conflicts in far-away
countries – which might trigger troop deployment. To
control for this, we include a count of how many TCCs
in a mission come from the same UN regional bloc as the
mission country. Finally, some countries have very spe-
cific national deployment rules that are often historically
determined. Swedish troops in the Malian MINUSMA
mission, for instance, have stricter deployment caveats,
due to evacuation concerns, than their Chadian counter-
parts. Our mission- and conflict-fixed effects models in
Table II account for this to some extent (since many of
these restrictions are of historical nature and thus time-
invariant). Nevertheless, we include a count variable that
captures how many European countries (including
Japan) participated in the mission, with the expectation
that if our result (and troop quality measure) is entirely
biased by these deployment restrictions it should disap-
pear once we control for this explicitly. In all model
specifications (see Table D.1 in the Online appendix),
the coefficient for the troop quality proxy remains neg-
ative and statistically significant. We are therefore confi-
dent that our results are not driven by a systematic bias in
the political willingness of TCCs to commit and deploy
their troops to a PKO.
Another possible alternative explanation is that it is
not the peacekeepers’ troop quality which leads to
reduced OSV, but that both the presence of high-
quality peacekeepers and lower levels of civilian killings
are driven by a ceasefire between parties (Fortna, 2004).
An additional potential source of bias is the type of
mandate (Hultman, 2010). Two types of mandates
might systematically affect our results: first, a mandate
that allows for the use of military force (Chapter VII
mandates) and/or a mandate that explicitly calls for the
protection of civilians. Since TCCs with better equipped
militaries might systematically shy away from deploying
their troops to missions where soldiers might be put into
harm’s way, the type of mandate might be driving both a
mission’s average troop quality and the mission’s ability
to protect civilians from violence. Finally, deployment of
better equipped troops to UN peace operations could
also be affected by the presence of non-UN troops in
the same country to a different mission that might or
might not support the UN peacekeeping operation (Gai-
bulloev et al., 2015). Many Western countries choose to
deploy their troops to peace operations; quite often,
however, they are not under UN command, but either
under their own command structure or in the context of
an operation led by a regional organization, such as the
European Union or NATO.
Controlling explicitly for these variables does not sub-
stantially change our results (see Appendix D.2). We
report the results of a series of additional robustness
checks in the Online supplementary appendix. We test
whether the effect of troop quality is robust to (1) an
alternative measure of troop quality that only uses the
weighted average of troop contributing countries’ mili-
tary expenditures instead of also weighting by military
personnel, (2) the exclusion of Sudan as potentially dis-
torting case, (3) adding a measure of total UN mission
expenditures,22 (4) a model in which we include all vari-
ables presented in the previous section, including
mission fixed effects, (5) varying time lengths of post-
conflict periods, and (6) excluding TCCs with less than
40 troops. Across these different specifications, our
results remain largely stable: higher measures of troop
quality are consistently associated with fewer civilian
killings.
Conclusion
In this article, we demonstrate that troop quality of UN
peace operations can reduce civilian victimization in
internal conflicts. Well-trained troops with adequate
equipment, high-quality intelligence, and diplomatic
support from their troop donors are better able to deter
violence from state and non-state actors, can reach
remote and inaccessible locations, inflict higher costs
on combatants who target civilians, and have superior
abilities in monitoring peace agreements than similar
operations with troops that are less apt for peacekeeping
tasks. These operational advantages translate into better
capabilities to protect civilians.
Our findings complement existing scholarship on
peacekeeping operations by offering a more fine-
grained explanation of their violence-reducing effect and
to the puzzle of why large or diverse peacekeeping troops
are not always able to prevent violence against civilians.
Our evidence suggests that troop quality is a critical
ingredient for successful peace operations, in addition
to troop size and diversity.
Future research should invest in better measures of
mission capacity. While our proxy indicator has suffi-
cient face validity and does capture relatively well the
broad tendency of a mission’s operational capacity, it
misses specific nuances. For instance, we lack precise,
22 Since the UN compensates TCCs this variable ensures that our
troop quality measure does not reflect UN mission expenditures.
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comparative, and comprehensive information about
training of forces, airlift capacity, vehicle quality, or intel-
ligence capabilities, particularly when it comes to mis-
sion owned equipment. Another avenue for future
research, particularly quantitative studies, is the decision-
making process of TCCs to deploy specific types of
troops to PKOs. Existing research has largely focused
on why countries contribute troops to PKOs in the first
place (Gaibulloev et al., 2015). Why countries deploy
certain kinds of troops with varying rules of engagement
is less understood, however. In this article, we treat this
question only as a source of bias for the relationship
between troop quality and civilian protection. Yet we
believe that putting deployment strategies front and cen-
ter, as well as more direct measures of PKOs’ operational
capabilities, holds much potential to better understand
peacekeeping performance.
Replication data
Replication scripts, data, and the Online appendix can
be found at http://www.prio.on/jpr/datasets. All analyses
were conducted in R 3.4.1 and Stata 13.1.
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